Watchdog reveals Chinese research threats at US defense labs

U.S. universities have hosted Chinese researchers with documented ties to China’s Communist Party (CCP) inside American defense-funded laboratories, according to an investigative report by a government oversight organization.

The 124-page report, published last month by the American Accountability Foundation (AAF), reviewed Chinese nationals admitted on research visas and placed in U.S. universities and national laboratories.

The authors searched a universe of roughly 10,000 Chinese research visa holders and narrowed it to a tranche of 21 individuals.

The report recommended these people “because of the dual-use threat of their research, close ties to the military research sector in China, and/or clear ties to the Chinese Communist Party” needed to be “expelled from the United States or never be re-admitted.” 

Each case named an individual, visa status, U.S. affiliation, research focus, and documented links to Chinese party, military or sanctioned institutions. 

According to the report, some of those individuals include: 

• Yingkai Dong, a leading expert on exoskeletons that could enhance infantry operations, who was also an active supporter of the CCP in China; 
• Cen Zhang, a Georgia Tech AI and machine learning expert, who was recently part of the team that won a DARPA Artificial Intelligence Cyber Challenge; 
• Xiaoyi Chen at Indiana University, an expert in AI machine learning, who comes to the U.S. from PLA-tied universities, and whose mentor at IU was raided by the FBI; 
• Xiaoyi Fan at Harvard, one of the world’s leading experts on Western Equine Encephalitis Virus, which NIH, CDC, and DHS classify as a priority pathogen representing a grave threat to human health; 
• Zebin Li at UW-Madison, who is working on next-generation semiconductors and was a participant in China’s notorious Thousand Talents program focused on recruiting overseas scientific talent for the CCP. 

The Thousand Talents program has been characterized by the FBI as helping Chinese nationals “steal foreign technologies needed to advance China’s national, military, and economic goals.” 

The FBI noted the Chinese government runs more than 200 similar programs, all of which are designed to support its intelligence goals. 

Most of the “Talents” programs are run by university research departments in China that have close ties to the Chinese military. 

The U.S. cases found by AAF were concentrated at universities with on-campus military laboratories, top federal research funding recipients, Ivy League schools and national labs. 

The authors reported other Chinese individuals of concern worked in fields with dual civilian and military use, including artificial intelligence, quantum sensing, semiconductors, advanced materials, drone systems, cybersecurity, energy storage, exoskeleton research and chemistry. 

The report said several subjects identified held leadership roles in Chinese Communist Party organizations while in China, including party branch secretary positions at universities. 

Cao Qianying, for example, was secretary of the undergraduate party branch of the Department of Ocean Engineering and a top party leader while studying for her Ph.D., the report said. 

Others, such as Bijuan Chen at Purdue University, previously worked at the Chinese research institute, HPSTAR, an agency that appears on a U.S. Commerce Department blacklist for activities “contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.” 

The authors noted party membership was not the sole indicator used in the review. 

Chinese nationals, whether they are official party members or not, remain subject to Chinese national security and intelligence laws while abroad. 

Those laws require cooperation with state security services and allow for pressure through employment, travel documents and family members in China. 

In fact, it’s generally understood that traveling and working overseas are some perks allowed by the government, but only if it helps facilitate the theft of intellectual property or intelligence collection from the host countries. 

As a result, the authors at AAF treated prior affiliations and research with one of the intelligence gathering institutions in China as one of the factors in determining the threat level each of the researchers posed. 

The report said U.S. universities generally relied on federal visa approvals and standard background checks, which focus on criminal history rather than foreign party affiliation or work at restricted institutions. 

“As we conducted the research, it became clear that Chinese nationals, with the acquiescence of [U.S.] university leadership, have taken over significant portions of the research infrastructure of university research departments.” 

In several examples, Chinese nationals hired or supervised other Chinese nationals within the same laboratories, the report said. 

AAF said additional reviews of the backgrounds of other Chinese visa holders are planned. 

“There is more work to be done to address the threats to the United States, but this initial research report is a clear first step in demonstrating that there is progress to be made unmasking the research threat in our universities,” concluded AAF authors.